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THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MEGAPOLITICS OF POSTED WORKERS
DORTE SINDBJERG MARTINSEN* & MICHAEL BLAUBERGER**
I
INTRODUCTION
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)1 is often criticized for
judicialization of politics and at times, the CJEU is called into the terrain of megapolitics. The posting of workers in the European Union (EU) is such a terrain of
mega-politics, characterized by deep conflicts between EU free movement
principles and national social protection. A “posted worker” is employed in one
EU member state, but temporarily sent by his or her employer to another EU
member state to provide a service. Since posted workers do not migrate
permanently, they principally remain subject to the law of their sending country.
They are also entitled to a core of rights in the receiving country. This
constellation triggers fundamental questions about social justice between and
within EU member states, which are mega-political in all three respects theorized
in the introduction to this special issue.2 At the inter-state level, the basic question
is which country’s labour and social regulation applies to posted workers. At the
societal level, the opportunity for firms to rely on workers governed by foreign
rules may call into question domestic compromises between capital and labour,
like wage levels and social security. Finally, conflicts about the posting of workers
invoke sovereignty concerns, begging the question of how to balance the freedom
to provide services, protected by EU rules, and the regulation of labour relations,
regarded as a matter of national sovereignty by EU member states.
After the EU Eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007, posting of workers has
substantially increased. In industries such as construction, willing citizens from
poorer, new EU member states have had increased opportunities to work at
comparatively low wage levels in richer Western and Northern EU member
states.3 In the wake of this increased labour mobility, the EU free movement
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1. In the following Article, we also use the abbreviation CJEU for the Court of Justice of the
European Union for the earlier period, when the official name was the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
2. Karen J. Alter & Mikael Rask Madsen, The International Adjudication of Mega-Politics, 84 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4, 2021, at 1.
3. See JENS ARNHOLTZ & NATHAN LILLIE, European Integration and the Reconfiguration of
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rules have become contested in terms of their consequences for national labour
markets and welfare states.4 Arguably, this contestation of free movement is part
of a larger trend towards politicization of European integration, that is, the mass
public’s increasing engagement with and contestation of European integration.5
Eurosceptic and anti-immigration attitudes are often closely related.6 Political
forces have thus mobilized against both European integration and immigration
within and into the European Union. European scholars even suggest that a new
political cleavage has emerged, that is, a new line of conflict, which divides
European citizens and the politics of political parties on whether they support or
reject European integration and its free movement regime. Different labels for
this new cleavage have been proposed,7 which share the common notion that
traditional cleavages based on class or religion are insufficient to understand
European politics today.8
In this article, we examine what happens when the CJEU is called upon to
intervene in a highly political subject-matter that divides significant segments of
society and invokes mega-political disputes.9 The puzzle for us is two-fold,
bringing in both politicization and judicialization. We thus examine 1) the

National Industrial Relations: Posted Work as a Driver of Institutional Change, in POSTED WORK IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FREE MOVEMENT 1, 5–6 (Jens Arnholtz & Nathan
Lillie eds., 2020).
4. Susanne K. Schmidt, Michael Blauberger, & Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Free Movement and
Equal Treatment in an Unequal Union, 25 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y, 1391, 1391 (2018).
5. Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, 39 BRIT. J. OF POL. SCI. 1, 5 (2009).
6. Dimiter Toshkov & Elitsa Kortenska, Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for
Integration in the European Union?, 53 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD., 910, 911 (2015).
7. See, e.g., HANSPETER KRIESI, EDGARD GRANDE, ROMAIN LACHAT, MARTIN DOLEZAL,
SIMON BORNSHIER, & TIMOTHEOS FREY, WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 9 (2008) (explaining demarcation vs. integration cleavage); Liesbet Hooghe, Gary
Marks, & Carole J. Wilson, Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?, 35
COMP. POL. STUD. 965, 689 (2002) (distinguishing between GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) vs TAN
(traditionalism/authority/nationalism)); Catherine E. De Vries, The Cosmopolitan-Parochial Divide:
Changing Patterns of Party and Electoral Competition in the Netherlands and Beyond, 25 J. OF EUR. PUB.
POL’Y 1541, 1551–52 (2018) (proposing to speak of a “cosmopolitan-parochial divide” to capture
essentially the same new cleavage).
8. For further elaboration of how globalization and European integration have affected traditional
cleavages, see also Rafaela M. Dancygier & Stephanie Walter, Globalization, Labor Market Risks, and
Class Cleavages, in THE POLITICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM 133 (Pablo Beramendi et al. eds., 2015);
Maurizio Ferrera & Alessandro Pellegata, Worker Mobility Under Attack? Explaining Labour Market
Chauvinism in the EU, 25 J. OF EUR. POL. 1461 (2018); Felix Karstens, How Public Discourse Affects
Attitudes Towards Freedom of Movement and Schengen, 21 EUR.UNION POL. 43 (2020); Céline Teney
Onawa Promise Lacewell & Pieter De Wilde, Winners and Losers of Globalization in Europe: Attitudes
and Ideologies, 6 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 575 (2014); Stephanie Walter, Globalization and the Demand-Side
of Politics: How Globalization Shapes Labor Market Risk Perceptions and Policy Preferences, 5 POL. SCI.
RES. AND METHODS 55 (2017).
9. Our case makes it possible to empirically investigate the combination of a highly political subject
matter and supranational judicial intervention as presented by Alter and Madsen in the introduction to
this special issue. Alter and Madsen assume that such combination will increase the likelihood of adverse
political response, making mega-politics cases the most likely cases for political backlash. See Alter and
Madsen, supra note 2.
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politicization of the posting of workers in general and of judicialized conflicts
about the posting of workers in particular, and 2) the impact of politicization on
judicial decision-making on the posting of workers. We are ultimately interested
in how these two processes relate. We cannot establish a causal link between
politicization and judicialization, but we seek to uncover a potential relationship
between the two processes by means of new data and by asking two research
questions (RQ):
RQ1: To what extent has the posting of workers been politicized, and has
judicialization further increased or decreased politicization of the issue?
RQ2: In light of politicization of posted work, how did CJEU jurisprudence
evolve with respect to a) the Court’s assertiveness or self-restraint and to b) its
substantive impact, that is, its influence on the subsequent legislative
negotiations?
To address these questions, we will examine how sequences of politicization
and judicialization unfold over time and relate to one another. In principle, EU
regulation on posting of workers contains all three kinds of mega-political
disputes. The extent to which these conflicts have actually reached mass public
attention remains an empirical question. If they have reached such attention, we
must also ask whether such politicization already characterized the field before
adjudication on the matter, as well as how adjudication impacts politicization.
RQ1 thus asks for the sequences of politicization and judicialization and how they
unfold in relation to one another. RQ2 digs further into the central question of
what happens in the aftermath of adjudication of mega-politics as formulated in
the introduction to this special issue.10
This article is structured as follows. Part II describes in greater detail the three
kinds of mega-political issues involved in conflicts about the posting of workers
in the EU. Subsequently, in Part III, we discuss the concepts of judicialization
and public backlash on an abstract level and more specifically with respect to the
field of posting of workers, including an overview of early CJEU case law on
posting until its famous Laval ruling, challenging the right to collective actions in
relation to free movement of services.11 Part IV then introduces the concept of
politicization, before measuring the politicization of the posting of workers over
time, both as a general policy issue and specifically when related to CJEU
jurisprudence. For this, a novel data set of newspaper articles from five EU
member states (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain) between 2000 and
2020 was collected and coded in terms of the three key dimensions of
politicization12: salience, actor involvement and polarization. We find that since
EU Eastern enlargement in 2004, the issue of posted work has been politicized,
that is, it has attracted considerable media attention and involved a broad range
10. Alter and Madsen, supra note 2.
11. Case C-346/06, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I11767.
12. Section IV A, infra, further details on how politicization can be conceptualized, operationalized,
and measured empirically along the three dimensions.
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of governmental as well as non-governmental actors with polarized positions.
Notably, when the CJEU developed its highly contested Laval jurisprudence on
the issue of posting, it did not trigger politicization as such, but rather entered an
already established terrain of mega-politics. Part V analyzes how the CJEU
responded to politicization and traces its more recent case law on the posting of
workers after Laval. While we cannot establish a direct causal link, we show that
the Court has adopted a more restrained interpretation of the freedom to provide
services after the massive politicization of the Laval judgement and, thereby, also
helped to overcome obstacles to a political solution at the EU level, eventually
leading to the revision of the Posted Workers Directive in 2018. Part VI
concludes by summarizing the main findings of our analysis and their relation to
the overall topic of the special issue on mega-politics.
II
THE MEGA-POLITICS OF POSTED WORK
As outlined in the introduction to this special issue, mega-politics litigation
can be i) inter-state driven “where important state interests diverge,” ii) socialcleavage driven, when strong societal cleavages undergird an essentially domestic
dispute, or iii) sovereignty-driven, when only individual countries are involved,
but “absent international judicial involvement, there would be no legal issue to
adjudicate.” While these are analytically distinct categories of mega-politics, the
mega-politics of posted work in the EU combines aspects of all three categories.
To begin, disputes about EU market freedoms are often inter-state conflicts
about the costs and benefits of economic liberalization. In the area of posted
work, these conflicts divide economically more developed from less developed
EU member countries. The former mostly receive posted workers and seek to
protect their higher standards in terms of labour rights and social protection
against “social dumping.”13 By contrast, economically less developed member
states are mostly posting workers. From their perspective, lower wages and
production costs are their main competitive advantages, which are threatened by
protectionism, if higher social standards and wages for posted workers are
required.14 This conflict between receiving and sending countries already
characterized the negotiations of the original Posted Workers Directive in the
early 1990s.15 After Eastern Enlargements in 2004 and 2007, economic
heterogeneity within the EU increased considerably. That also increased the
13. See Frederic De Wispelaere & Jozef Pacolet, The Benefits of Posting: Facts and Figures on the
Use and Impact of Intra-EU Posting, POSTED WORK IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF FREE MOVEMENT 31, 34 (2019).
14. See Bernard Steuenberg, How Implementation Affects Revision: EU Decision-Making on
Changing the Posting of Workers Directive, JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 1, 7 (describing
the different EU member state preferences on facilitating unhindered posting of workers or on increasing
the social protection of posted workers).
15. See WERNER EICHHORST, EUROPÄISCHE SOZIALPOLITIK ZWISCHEN ZATIONALER
AUTONOMIE UND MARKTFREIHEIT [EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY BETWEEN NATIONAL AUTONOMY
AND MARKET FREEDOM] 172–77 (2000).
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potential for this kind of inter-state conflict.16 Redistributive conflict is even
exacerbated in the case of posted work, as receiving states largely depend on
sending states regarding the enforcement of labour regulation.17 Moreover,
whereas most Western EU member states shielded their labour markets by
restricting the free movement of workers from Central and Eastern Europe for
up to seven years after enlargement, posted work falls under the free movement
of services and was not subject to transitional arrangements. Consequently, the
number of posted workers in the EU rose immediately after Eastern
Enlargement and has continued growing since then.18 The most politicized
judgement on posting — and arguably one of the most politicized CJEU cases
ever — the Laval ruling19 (C-341/05) in 2007 — was also characterized by this preexisting divide between EU member states. Before the case was heard, sixteen
governments had submitted written observations to the CJEU, which clustered
around two opposed positions: all newer member states advocated a liberal
interpretation of the services freedom, whereas almost all old member states
(except for the UK and Ireland) supported a more restrictive interpretation.20
Whatever the CJEU had decided, it would have upset one of these two groups.
Secondly, conflicts about posted work reflect fundamental social cleavages.
As our media analysis below will show in greater detail, the issue of posting is not
just a governmental affair. It mobilizes a broad spectrum of stakeholders at the
domestic level. Essentially, their conflict is between capital and labour.21 Posted
work provides one opportunity for employers to reduce labour costs in the EU’s
internal market, which increases competitive pressure on the domestic workforce
and weakens the bargaining position of trade unions.22 Unlike other forms of
international wage and locational competition, posted work arrangements even
allow firms to employ local and foreign workers side-by-side while arbitraging
between different national labour regulations.23 Domestic cleavages and power
relations have been found to strongly shape member state responses to CJEU
posted workers cases.24 For example, German Länder responses to the Court’s
16. Martin Höpner & Armin Schäfer, Embeddedness and Regional Integration: Waiting for Polanyi
in a Hayekian Setting, 66 INT’L ORG. 429, 436–38 (2012).
17. Susanne K. Schmidt, When Efficiency Results in Redistribution: The Conflict over the Single
Services Market, 32 W. EUR. POL. 847, 855 (2009).
18. De Wispelaere & Pacolet, supra note 13.
19. Laval, supra note 11.
20. Nicole Lindstrom, Service Liberalization in the Enlarged EU: A Race to the Bottom or the
Emergence of Transnational Political Conflict?, 48 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 1307, 1316 (2010).
21. See generally Daniel Seikel, Class Struggle in the Shadow of Luxembourg: The Domestic Impact
of the European Court of Justice’s Case Law on the Regulation of Working Conditions, 22 J. OF EUR. PUB.
POL’Y 1166 (2015) (explaining that the national distribution of power between capital and labor affects
the domestic impact of CJEU jurisprudence) [hereinafter Class Struggle in the Shadow of Luxembourg].
22. See id. at 1176 (explaining that the Laval decision weakened the domestic bargaining power of
trade unions).
23. Schmidt, supra note 17, at 856.
24. See Michael Blauberger, With Luxembourg in Mind: The Remaking of National Policies in the
Face of ECJ Jurisprudence, 19 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 109, 118–21 (2012) (describing the different
responses within Germany to the Rüffert ruling).
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Rüffert25 ruling from 2008 greatly differed between economically liberal and
socially democratic governments.26 And whereas the Laval ruling weakened the
position of Swedish trade unions, its effects were less pronounced in Denmark
due to a cross-class coalition of trade unions and employers seeking to protect
the ‘Danish model.’27 Importantly, domestic cleavages not only shape the
application of CJEU jurisprudence, but are also at the origin of posted workers
cases. In the Laval conflict, Swedish employers even lent financial support to the
foreign service provider and used the case as an “opportunity . . . to challenge
Swedish labour and social laws.”28 After all, Laval did not create a conflict
between member states or social partners. It originated from a domestic dispute
with a strong international dimension.
Finally, posted workers cases may trigger sovereignty concerns, which would
not exist without European jurisprudence. With its landmark judgement in Rush
Portuguesa Limitada v. Office National d’Immigration, the CJEU established
that posted workers are not covered by the free movement and equal treatment
of workers (as they do not enter the labour market of the host country), but by
the free movement of services (and, therefore, are primarily subject to the
labour).29 Consequently, many posted workers cases are essentially about the
extent to which EU member states may apply and enforce their own labour laws
vis-à-vis posted workers without unduly restricting the services freedom. This
question gets even more sovereignty-sensitive when it touches upon the
autonomy of social partners rather than leaving conflicts to international courts.30
Even though EU Treaty law (Art. 153 TFEU, ex-Art. 137 TEC) explicitly
protects the right to collective action as a national competence, the Laval
judgement challenged collective actions of Swedish trade unionists as restrictions
of the free movement of services. What is more, it particularly affected Nordic
EU member states, which are not only characterized by autonomous collective
bargaining, but also by a strong notion of parliamentary sovereignty and,
accordingly, a greater reluctance towards supranational judicial review.31
In sum, whenever the CJEU is called to rule on the posting of workers, it
enters the terrain of mega-politics in one way or another. However, as stated in
the introduction, the extent to which the posting of workers actually attracts mass
public attention, that is, whether it is politicized before the CJEU is asked to
25. Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989.
26. See id. See also Detlef Sack, Europeanization Through Law, Compliance, and Party Differences:
The ECJ’s ‘Rüffert’ Judgment (C-346/06) and Amendments to Public Procurement Laws in German
Federal States, 34 J. OF EUR. INTEGRATION 241, 253–54 (2012).
27. Class Struggle in the Shadow of Luxembourg, supra note 21, at 1174.
28. Lindstrom, supra note 20, at 1314.
29. Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Ltd. v. Off. Nat’l d’Immigr., 1990 E.C.R. I-1417.
30. See Blauberger, supra note 24, at 117 (noting the differences in the Danish and Swedish political
responses to the Laval inquiry).
31. Marlene Wind, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen & Gabriel Pons Rotger, The Uneven Legal Push for
Europe: Questioning Variation when National Courts Go to Europe, 10 EUR. UNION POL. 63, 72–73
(2009) (explaining the relatively low number of case referrals from Nordic EU member state courts to
the CJEU by the general reservations against strong judicial review in these countries).
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adjudicate and how adjudication affects further politicization, remains an
empirical question. Before turning to our empirical analysis, we present the
judicialization of posting of workers in the EU.
III
THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POSTED WORK
The posting of workers in the EU triggers mega-political conflicts, and the
potential for such conflicts increases with economic heterogeneity. Hence, it did
not take long after EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 until several major conflicts
about the posting of workers reached European courts. In this part, we first
discuss on an abstract level the concept of judicialization, i.e., the transfer of
political disputes into the legal arena as well as potential feedback to
judicialization, before describing the judicialization of conflicts about posted
workers in the EU.
A. Judicialization and Political Reactions
The judicialization of politics is a central narrative in describing the interplay
between law and politics in the E.U. Judicialization of politics generally refers to
a process where courts and judges increasingly intervene in politics and
policymaking.32 The term judicialization has a dynamic connotation and generally
seems to suggest a hierarchical relationship, where adjudication impacts the
political—and not the other way around.33
However, in mega-politics, a different dynamic is likely to play out. When the
judiciary enters highly politicized issue areas, political reactions from involved
parties should be expected.34 Andreas Hoffmann, as well as Madsen, Cebulak &

32. See id.; Karen J. Alter, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Laurence R. Helfer, Theorizing the
Judicialization of International Relations, 63 INT’L STUD. Q. 449, 449 (2019).
33. At times, scholars even present judicialization as trumping legislative politics in the EU,
implying that politics is framed and often decided by law rather than the EU legislator. See generally
Gareth Davies, The European Union Legislature as an Agent of the European Court of Justice, 54 J. OF
COMMON MKT. STUD. 846, 846–61 (2016) (describing the constraints imposed by CJEU jurisprudence
on the EU legislature); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
IN EUROPE and JACK HAYWARD & EDWARD C. PAGE, GOVERNING THE NEW EUROPE (expressing
similar interpretations).
34. See Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN.
REV. OF POL. SCI. 93, 109 (2008) [hereinafter The Judicialization of Mega-Politics] (noting that political
actors that are strongly against judicial decisions may aim to “clip the wings of overactive courts”). The
extent to which judicialization actually impacts political outcomes depends on these subsequent political
reactions. Politicians have different means at their disposal to quell the impact of unwelcome
developments. See generally LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS
POLITICAL PROCESS, 200–30 (Princeton University Press 1988) (explaining the different methods by
which Congress may curb the Court). See also RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS
AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 206 (Harvard University Press 2009)
(explaining how the political sphere may curb the court, such as by sheer bureaucratic disregard). Such
political reactions can be effective in quelling the impact of judicial decisions because courts depend on
third party compliance and enforcement of their decisions for these to have a more general impact. See,
e.g., The Judicialization of Mega-Politics at 110 (noting examples where American legislature hampered
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Wiebusch distinguish between two forms of reactions; push-back and back-lash.35
A “pushback” connotes a softer form of resistance where member states or other
actors are unsatisfied with the development of a court’s jurisprudence and seek
to influence its impact or subsequent development.36 A “backlash” constitutes
the more rare and severe form of resistance, which may ultimately reform or even
dismantle the court as an institution.37 When pushing back against the court,
politicians may take the legislative road, changing and clarifying the law so that
future litigation will stay out of mega-politics.38 EU politicians may also try to
override jurisprudence. Although overrides are rare, a credible threat thereof
may be sufficient to push the Court to readjust its position.39 Or politicians may
push back by insufficiently implementing the judicial decision so that its impact
is diminished or even neglected.40
Thus, in theory, political pushbacks can restrain judicialization and its impact.
However, we know little about the mechanisms or processes of such adverse
political responses or when a pushback or backlash is strong enough to make the
Court react. To examine the interplay between judicialization and politicization,
we suggest a sequential model, where both who responds, as well as the scope or
sphere of response, matter. The sequential logic is as follows: 1) the Court
interprets the question before it, 2) political actors take positions on the judicial
interpretations and respond, and 3) the Court takes into account or ignores the
political responses in its subsequent interpretations. In the case of posted
workers, the relevant positions which political actors may split around concerns
the mega-political dimensions. Different positions may emerge between states on
each side of the social cleavage and in relation to sovereignty. We expect the
courts’ responsiveness to increase depending on how many member states take
positions that align the Court’s interpretation. These governmental positions can
the implementation of court decisions); LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, at 202 (Cornell University Press 2002) (describing EU member states’ strategies
to limit the impact of CJEU jurisprudence at the implementation stage).
35. Andreas Hofmann, Resistance Against the Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 INT’L J.
OF L. IN CONTEXT 258, 258 (2018). See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak & Micha Wiebusch,
Backlash Against International Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International
Courts, 14 INT’L J. OF L. IN CONTEXT 197 (2018).
36. Madsen et al., supra note 35, at 198.
37. Id.
38. See MAURIZIO FERRERA, THE BOUNDARIES OF WELFARE: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND
THE NEW SPATIAL POLITICS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION (Oxford University Press 2005); Dorte Sindbjerg
Martinsen, AN EVER MORE POWERFUL COURT?: THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS OF LEGAL
INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, at 4–5 (Oxford University Press 2015) [hereinafter The
Political Constraints of Legal Integration in the European Union] (noting that the legislature can override
unwanted jurisprudence). See also Fabio Wasserfallen, The Judiciary as Legislator? How the European
Court of Justice Shapes Policy-Making in the European Union, 17:8 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1128, 1130
(2010) (describing how the CJEU may shape EU policy-making).
39. See Olof Larsson & Daniel Naurin, Judicial Independence and Political Uncertainty: How the
Risk of Override Affects the Court of Justice of the EU, 70 INT’L ORG. 377, 379 (2016) (arguing that the
“possibility of override is a significant factor affecting judicial behavior”).
40. See CONANT, supra note 34, at 226 (describing implementation gaps in the UK and Germany,
as well as non-implementation in France).
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be expressed by means of observations submitted to the Court before it decides
a case, as well as after the judgement when member state representatives express
their positions on a judicial decision in political debates and to the public. We
also expect it to matter to the Court’s responsiveness when non-governmental
actors take positions on a judicial interpretation. Political responses then extend
in scope, moving beyond the more insulated governmental sphere into the public
sphere, where a wider opposition may mobilize against the Court. Such
mobilization is likely to influence a wider spectrum of political actors and
legislators. If adverse political responses to judicialization are expressed by only
a few political actors who submit observations to the Court, we should not expect
the judiciary to react. But when CJEU jurisprudence is met by both opposition
from a wider set of member states, and politicization as expressed in the public
sphere, the Court is under more severe pressure.41 We expect that the
combination of member state opposition and politicization increases the
likelihood of Court responsiveness.42
Both judicialization and politicization are important dynamics in our area of
mega-politics. To some degree, continued EU integration and the adoption of
new legislative frameworks that govern cross-border interaction will inevitably
lead to an increase in court cases concerning newly established or reformed law.
In that sense, further integration will most likely also lead to an increase in the
number of judicial disputes in the respective legal and policy areas.
We consider judicialization as expressing an increase in the power or
authority of courts43 (they get to judge on more cases), while politicization is a
reaction to the issue at hand, as well as a reaction to the increase in Court
authority litigating the issue at hand. Analytically, we will distinguish between
the politicization of the overall issue, that is, posting of workers, and the
politicization of specific court cases.

41. See Michael Blauberger & Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, The Court of Justice in Times of
Politicization: ‘Law as a Mask and Shield’ Revisited, 27 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 382,
386 (2020) (analyzing the impact of governmental or public opposition against unwelcome CJEU
jurisprudence).
42. It is, however, important to note that such combination has been far from the standard political
response to CJEU jurisprudence. Many landmark CJEU decisions (for example, in relation to the
internal market or gender equality) were concluded without noticeable governmental or public
contestation, see generally RACHEL A. CHICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY:
LITIGATION, MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNANCE (2007); Joseph H. H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The
European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUDIES 510 (1994). A large number of
important cases of integration through law took place in a context of ‘permissive consensus’ and, even
today, still goes unnoticed by politicians and by the public if too technical or too specific. Blauberger &
Martinsen, supra note 41. In less politicized areas of integration, the Court is still likely to be the more
unrestrained motor of integration as once found by Burley and Mattli. See generally Anne-Marie Burley
& Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41
(1993).
43. For similar conceptualization, see Alter et al., THEORIZING THE JUDICIALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 32.
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B. The Judicialization of The Posting of Workers in the EU
The Court of Justice of the European Union stands out as an exceptionally
powerful international court, and judicial integration is found to be one of the
key dynamics in European integration. The CJEU is the key institution in an EU
process of judicialization. Two legal procedures are particularly important for
this process. The first very important procedure is the preliminary reference
procedure where a national court refers questions to the CJEU on interpretations
of European law. The procedure is laid down in Article 267 of the Treaty of the
European Union and its function is to ensure uniform interpretation and validity
of EU law across all the Member States.44 The other procedure is the
infringement procedure. Under it, the Commission can ask the CJEU for a
judgement on a member state’s compliance with European law.45 As we will see
below, both procedures have been invoked regarding posting of workers.
While most CJEU cases go unnoticed in the broader public and political
discussion, some are met with a lot of attention and spark particularly intense
public debates. Some of the most prominent cases of CJEU history stem from the
area of posted work.
The posting of workers has been politically controversial since its early
history. The European Commission first announced its intent to propose a
posting of workers directive as part of its 1991 social action program.46 The
proposal COM (1991) 230 was presented in August that same year.47 A long
process of political negotiations and disagreements followed. Disagreements
concerned the balance between free movement principles and the social
protection of workers, between posting and hosting Member States, between EU
regulation and national law and practices, and along more ideological lines
between left and right. The year before the start of negotiations, the Rush
Portuguesa case concluded. In the case, the CJEU concluded that Community
law did not preclude Member States from applying national labour law or
collective agreements onto posting firms.48 Hosting Member States thus used the
case as a justification for enacting national labour law onto posted workers.
In its proposal, however, the Commission took a different stance, aiming to
modify the impact of the caselaw, which it found to work against the internal
market principles.49 The Commission proposed Article 3.2, under which workers

44. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, May
9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 0164.
45. This procedure is laid down by Article 258 of the Treaty of the European Union. See
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 258, May 9, 2008,
2008 O.J. (C 115) 0160.
46. Eeva Kolehmainen, The Directive Concerning the Posting of Workers: Synchronization of the
Functions of National Legal Systems, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 71, 79 (1998).
47. Commission Proposal for A Council Directive Concerning the Posting of Workers in the
Framework of the Provision of Services, COM (1991) 230 final (Aug. 30, 1991).
48. See Rush Portuguesa, supra note 29, at ¶ 18.
49. See Paul Davies, The Posted Workers Directive and the EC Treaty, 31 INDUS. L. J. 298, 300 (2002)
(detailing the Commission’s response to member-state legislation after the Rush Portugesa case).
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posted for less than three months would be subject to the home Member State’s
labour laws.50 The European Parliament and the majority of member states in the
Council fiercely opposed this part of the proposal and successfully made their
case with reference to the Rush Portuguesa case, so that in the adopted posting
of workers directive, the period during which the home Member State’s
legislation would be applicable was reduced to only eight days.51 This historical
background, as well as subsequent developments, make the posting of workers a
prime example for what happens when the CJEU steps into a terrain of megapolitics, where both dynamics of judicialization and politicization are in play.
The CJEU has often been asked to decide issues related to posting of
workers, especially since EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 (see Figure 5). As was
already introduced above, the Court initiated its distinct jurisprudence on posted
workers by subsuming them under the free movement of services in Rush
Portugesa in 1990.52 That laid the ground for the posting of workers directive
96/71 as adopted in 1996.53 The directive sets out how the laws on minimum
wages, working time, and paid annual leave of the host member state apply to
posted workers.54 However, these laws in the host member state represent only
the most basic floor of protection. The directive also establishes that Article 3.1
“shall not prevent application of terms and conditions of employment which are
more favourable to workers.”55 Furthermore, the directive adds that rights can be
derived from collective agreements, not only from legislation,56 and that the
hosting Member State may take further measures in relation to posted workers
than those laid down in Article 3.1.57 The original directive as adopted thus aimed
to strike a delicate balance between internal market principles and social
protection.

50. See Martinsen, supra note 38.
51. See id.
52. See Rush Portuguesa, supra note 29, at ¶ 12.
53. Directive 96/71, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996
Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of Services, 1996 O.J. (L 18) 1
(EC).
54. Id. at art. 3.1.
55. Id. at art. 3.7.
56. Id. at art. 3.8.
57. Id. at art. 3.10.
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Figure 1: CJEU judgements on posting of workers 2000–2019

This balance was, however, called into question after EU Eastern
enlargement and led to the highly controversial Laval quartet of cases in 2007–
2008. In the four cases Viking,58 Laval,59 Ruffert,60 and Commission v.
Luxembourg,61 the CJEU gave more consideration to the free movement
principles against national labour regulation. In Viking, the Court ruled that the
right to strike can only be exercised within certain limits.62 The case concerned
the right to strike in relation to the right of establishment in Article 42 of the
Treaty.63 In Laval, the Court followed suit and concluded that the Treaty’s Article
49 (now Article 56 TFEU) and Article 3 of the posting of workers directive meant
that a trade union could not force a posting firm to sign a collective agreement.64
A posting firm could not be obliged to more favourable working conditions than

58. Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp. Workers’ Fed’n & Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP
and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, 2007 E.C.R. I-10806.
59. Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenksa.
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avd. 1, Bygettan, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767.
60. Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989.
61. Case C-319/06, Comm’n v. Grand Duchy of Lux., 2008 E.C.R. 1-04323.
62. See Viking, supra note 58, at ¶ 44.
63. Id. at ¶ 27.
64. See Laval, supra note 11, at ¶ 111.
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the minimum conditions set in the posting of workers directive.65 In Rüffert, the
Court found that the Public Procurement Act in the German state Lower Saxony
imposed an unjustified restriction of the services freedom by requiring firms
bidding for tenders to commit themselves to pay minimum wages according to
local collective agreements.66 In the last case, Commission v. Luxembourg, the
Commission argued that Luxembourg had not transposed Articles 3.1 and 3.10
of the posting of workers directive correctly because it imposed too many
national standards on posting firms.67 The Court followed this argument and laid
down that Article 3.10 constituted a derogation of the principle of freedom to
provide services and, therefore, had to be interpreted restrictively.68
To capture judicialization, we identified crucial court cases that have been
decided on posting of workers during the analyzed period (see Table 1). By
selecting and focusing on specific court cases, we can identify the dynamics that
occur in relation to specific events, that is, in this case CJEU judgements that are
a primary expression of the judicialization of the issue areas under consideration.
Table 1. Crucial court cases
Posting of workers
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Viking (C–438/05)
Laval (C–341/05)
Commission vs Luxembourg (C–319/06)
Rüffert (C-346/06)
Regiopost case (C-115/14)
ESA (C-396/13)
Bundesdruckerei GmbH v Stadt Dortmund (C-549/13)
Dobersberger (C-16/18)
IV

TRACING THE POLITICIZATION OF POSTED WORK AND CJEU CASE LAW
OVER TIME
The next two parts trace sequences of politicization and judicialization over
time and examine how these processes relate to one another. We begin by
establishing empirically when mega-political conflicts about the posting of
workers in the EU actually attracted mass public attention, and how public
attention developed further once courts had to decide these conflicts. For this,
we first introduce and operationalize a multi-dimensional concept of
politicization, which guided our collection and coding of newspaper articles on
the posting of workers from five EU member states. We then present the main
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id.
See Rüffert, supra note 25, at ¶ 43.
See Grand Duchy of Lux., supra note 61, at ¶¶ 15–16.
See id. at ¶¶ 49–52, 54–55.
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findings of our analysis and show how, contrary to the perception of many Court
observers at the time,69 the CJEU entered an already heavily politicized field
when it issued its famous Laval judgement in December 2007.
A. Conceptualizing and Measuring Politicization
Whereas “mega-political” refers to the inherent quality of a political conflict,
its “utmost political significance that often . . . divide[s] whole polities,”70 we draw
on the related concept of “politicization” to measure empirically when an issue
such as the posting of workers is actually perceived as important and divisive by
large parts of society. Politicization refers to the way in which issues become
subject to public contestation71 and is commonly defined as a three dimensional
process that involves increased salience, expansion of actors and polarization of
opinions.72 According to research on EU politicization, the three dimensions are
interrelated but refer to different aspects of the same dynamics.73 Salience refers
to the visibility of a given issue in public debates and, thus, relates to the
“significance” in Hirschl’s definition of mega-politics above.74 Only when a topic
is frequently raised by political actors in public can we speak about politicization.
Actor expansion concerns the range of contestation and refers to an increasing
number of actors involved in public debates. The argument is that if only a few
elite actors advance their positions on an issue, it is only politicized to a limited
extent.75 Even though societal mobilization is part of the definition for all kinds
of mega-political conflicts discussed in the introduction to this special issue, actor
expansion is particularly relevant for the second type of mega-political conflicts:
conflicts that mobilize large segments of domestic societies beyond governmental
actors. Polarization is the third dimension of politicization. It captures the idea
of divisiveness in Hirschl’s definition of mega-politics above, as it concerns the
extent to which actors’ positions on an issue differ. For an issue to be polarized,
opposing positions must be identifiable.
69. See, e.g., Christian Joerges & Florian Rödl, Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social
Deficit’ of European Integration: Reflections After the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval, 15 EUR.
L. J. 1, 1 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s Viking and Laval judgments “caused quite a heated critical
debate”) (emphasis added).
70. Hirschl, supra note 34, at 94.
71. See Michael Zürn, Martin Binder & Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, International Authority and Its
Politicization, 4 INT’L THEORY 69, 71 (2012).
72. See Edgar Grande & Swen Hutter, Introduction: European Integration and the Challenge of
Politicisation, in POLITICISING EUROPE: INTEGRATION AND MASS POLITICS 3, 8 (Swen Hutter et al.
eds., 2016) (distinguishing between “issue salience (visibility), actor expansion (range), and actor
polarisation (intensity and direction)”); Pieter de Wilde, Anna Leupold & Henning Schmidtke,
Introduction: The Differentiated Politicisation of European Governance, 39 W. EUR. POL. 3, 4 (2016)
(positing “that politicization can be empirically observed in (a) the growing salience of European
governance, involving (b) a polarisation of opinion, and (c) an expansion of actors and audiences engaged
in monitoring EU affairs”).
73. Edgar Grande & Swen Hutter, Beyond Authority Transfer: Explaining the Politicisation of
Europe, 39 W. EUR. POL. 23, 25 (2016).
74. See Hirschl, supra note 34, at 94.
75. See Grande & Hutter, supra note 73, at 31.
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In order to investigate the politicization of the posting of workers, we
collected newspaper articles from a selection of EU countries addressing the
issue across the covered twenty-year period from 2000 to 2020. We included
newspapers from five countries in our analysis: Austria, Denmark, France,
Germany, and Spain. Our country selection includes Northern, Continental, and
Southern Member States, which are all receiving countries when it comes to
posting. For all five countries, posted workers are part of their workforces and
national labour markets. According to the Commission’s factsheets on posted
workers, Germany received the highest number of posted workers in the
European Union in 2016, while France had the second highest, Austria had the
fourth highest, Spain had the eighth highest, and Denmark had the fifteenth
highest.76
As we aimed to comparatively examine politicization over twenty years for
five countries, we had to limit our analysis to cover one newspaper per country.
We investigated newspaper coverage for one quality paper in each of the five
different member countries.77 We have selected daily newspapers that have
European sections and editorial staff, and which are not party-political papers,
but aim to cover issues from a center-political spectrum, though they may differ
as to whether they lean center-left or center-right. The newspapers sampled from
the five countries are: Die Presse (Austria), Politiken (Denmark), Le Figaro
(France), Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany) and El Pais (Spain). We examined
public debates throughout the entire period specified. In this way, we captured
both politicization of posted workers in general and as it may arise in relation to
specific events, such as a CJEU decision, a change of EU legislation, or other
relevant happenings.
Unlike TV news or tabloid newspapers, and even amidst the growing role of
social media, the quality press continues to be a “leading medium of political
coverage.”78 Therefore, this selection gives us a good representation of the public
debate about posting of workers in large parts of Western Europe. For each
newspaper, we identified all the newspaper articles that include keywords
associated with posting of workers in the respective language (Table 2).
Combining a keyword search with either the term for the European Union (EC,
EU, etc.) or the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU, CJEU, etc.) in each country’s
76. See Country Factsheets: Posted Workers 2016, EUR. COMM’NS., SOC. AFFS., & INCLUSION
PUBL’NS & DOCUMENTS,
https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?advSearchKey=PostWork2016&mode=advancedSubmit&catId=22
&policyArea=0&policyAreaSub=0&country=0&year=0&qty=50 [https://perma.cc/3N69-WZDC].
77. Grande & Hutter note that whereas the selection of only one newspaper per country is a
pragmatic decision, it is also a reasonable one. Their reliability tests and previous research based on
several national newspapers found only small differences between national newspapers when focusing
on a fairly broad aggregation level of issues and time. See Grande & Hutter, supra note 73, at 3.
78. JULIAN DEDERKE, CONTESTATION, POLITICIZATION, AND THE CJEU’S PUBLIC RELATIONS
TOOLBOX: JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU IN THEIR PUBLIC AND POLITICAL
CONTEXT 76 (2020) (citing Martin Dolezal, Swen Hutter & Bruno Wüest, Exploring the New Cleavage
Across Arenas and Public Debates: Design and Methods, in POLITICAL CONFLICT IN WESTERN EUROPE
36, 41 (Hanspeter Kriesi et al. eds., 2012)).
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language provided us with 1785 total newspaper articles for the twenty-year
period: 142 in Die Presse, 566 in Politiken, 574 in Le Figaro, 325 in El Pais and
178 in Süddeutsche Zeitung.

Table 2. Keywords searching for newspaper articles on the posting of workers
(searched for by relevant language)
Posting of workers
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

posted worker
posting of workers
labour mobility
free movement of workers
social dumping
polish plumber
right to collective action
right to strike
road transport
cabotage

In line with previous research and our conceptualization of politicization
above, we aim to capture salience, actor expansion and polarization as key
components of politicization.79 All three dimensions are operationalized with the
data we collected from newspapers. For a detailed presentation of our coding
strategy, see our online codebook. First, salience is operationalized as the number
of newspaper articles per year that deal with the subject of posted workers within
the EU. We only code articles that thematically refer to posted workers in the
EU but exclude articles that concern labour migration generally, or labour
migration from outside of the EU.
Second, regarding actor expansion, we differentiate between governmental
and non-governmental actors. On the one hand, governments are key actors in
mega-political conflicts at the inter-state level and when sovereignty concerns visà-vis international courts are at stake, resulting in pushback or backlash against
the increasing judicialization of the respective issue areas. On the other hand, the
broad mobilization of non-governmental actors is particularly important as an
indicator for mega-political conflicts between different segments of domestic
societies. Apart from governments, we therefore distinguish between different
types of non-governmental actors, such as political party (representative on local,
national, or European level), civil society actor, trade union, employers
association, citizen, scientist/expert, or independent. Like Grande and Hutter, we
measure the expansion of actors by the share of non-governmental actor

79. See, e.g., Grande & Hutter, supra note 73; de Wilde et al., supra note 72. See also Michael Zürn,
Opening Up Europe: Next Steps in Politicization Research, 39 W. EUR. POL. 164, 169 (2016).
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statements as a percentage of all coded statements.80
Third, to capture the polarization of the debate, we code the position of actors
taken in the debate. The position variable describes the political position of the
actor towards the EU (that is, towards a certain policy, regulative, directive,
stand, etc.). We adapt the coding from Grande and Hutter.81 An actor’s position
is coded based on whether the actor frames the outcome of EU legislation/policy
as positive (strongly affirmative +1; weakly affirmative +0.5), neutral or negative
(strongly opposed-1; weakly opposed -0.5). This can, for example, mean that a
politician emphasizes that social dumping is a negative consequence of the free
movement of labour (-1). The coding indicates whether the actor favours or
opposes a certain action, legislation, or decision taken by an EU institution. It
does not indicate whether the actors take a pro- or anti-EU standpoint generally.
If a newspaper article contains multiple actors stating a position, all the actors
and their positions are coded. If an actor states multiple positions in the same
article, only one is coded. If the actor both favours parts of a proposed EU-policy
and criticizes other aspects of it, the statement is coded as ambiguous (that is, ‘0’).
The coding includes only direct quotes from actors — not journalists referring to
statements in former debates.
The data we collect allows us to investigate the public debate about posting
of workers, both in general, as well as directly following (or in reaction to) specific
events like CJEU judgements. By looking at the public debate, we are able to
identify points in time when the issue area or particular court decision gets more
(or less) politicized. If an increase in politicization occurs directly in relation to a
court decision, we can assume with reasonable certainty that this intensification
is in response to the Court decision. If newspaper articles and the actors they
mention refer explicitly to court cases, we can directly investigate the debate
about the individual court case or judgement. Moreover, by looking at newspaper
coverage in the quality press across several EU countries, we are able to situate
this study at the interplay between the national and EU contexts, which is crucial
to understanding developments on the domestic level in response to
judicialization trends in the realm of international law.
B. The Politicization of Posted Work in General and CJEU Case Law in
Particular
Our newspaper analysis shows that the posting of workers in the European
Union was part of the public debate throughout the period 2000–2020, albeit to
strongly varying degrees. Figure 1 shows the salience of posted work measured
as the number of newspaper articles per year over the entire period a) aggregated
for all countries (to the left) and b) disaggregated into the individual countries
included in our analysis (to the right). The figure demonstrates that EU posted
work is salient in general, but salience is particularly pronounced in the periods

80. See Grande & Hutter, supra note 73, at 31, as well as our online appendix.
81. Id.
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between 2004–2008 and 2013–2017. The salience in these periods relates to
different main issues. Between 2004–2006, the public debate on posted work is
related to Eastern Enlargement and the proposal on a services directive for the
internal market, the so-called Bolkestein directive (COM (2004) 2), later adopted
as Directive 2006/123/EC.82 The debate concerned whether Eastern Enlargement
and the new directive would lead to social dumping. Between 2007–2008, the
public debate focused on the CJEU cases related to the Laval quartet. The
salience of EU posted work increased again between 2013 and 2017. The later
increases in salience concerned social dumping, particularly related to the
construction and transport sectors, as well as the reform of the posted workers
directive. The increase in salience in this period was mainly driven by a very
intense debate in France and Denmark.
Figure 2: Aggregated salience and country salience disaggregated

82. Directive 2006/123, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on
Services in the Internal Market, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 26.
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When we turn to the politicization of the CJEU in relation to the posting of
workers, figure 2 demonstrates that the role of the CJEU occupies a considerable
part of the salience measure. The figure shows CJEU mentions aggregated across
countries as a share of total salience. 2007–2008 marked a particular peak in the
CJEU salience measure. Across countries, the Laval ruling is much debated, as
were the Viking and Rüffert cases. However, when held against the total salience
measure, we see that the Laval quartet did not trigger general politicization of
the issue at hand. Rather, CJEU jurisprudence got drawn into the mega-politics
of posting when the issue had already been heavily politicized in general. The
Laval case continues to be mentioned in the later debate on CJEU rulings. In
later politicization, we see the role of the CJEU discussed and the extent to which
it prohibits national actions against social dumping, including the right to strike.
Among some actors, there is an expressed concern that the CJEU takes away
national labour market autonomy. In addition, we see the role of the CJEU
discussed in relation to social dumping in the transport sector, and the extent to
which proposed national actions to counteract social dumping will be hindered
by CJEU interpretations.
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Figure 2: Aggregated share of CJEU mentions of total salience

Turning to actor expansion, we see a constantly high level of actor
involvement. Figure 3 presents the share of non-governmental actors taking part
in a) the general debate of EU posting of workers (to the left) and b) in relation
to CJEU mentioning (to the right). As a constant feature throughout the period,
non-governmental actors took part in the debate, expressing opinions in mostly
more than 50% of the debate. The share of governmental actors taking a position
on the posting of workers in relation to CJEU cases was slightly higher. But we
also found considerable involvement of non-governmental actors. Generally, this
finding supports the second dimension of politicization, that is, conflicts about
the posting of workers are not just a concern for governmental elites, but also
mobilize broader audiences. The slightly lower share of non-governmental actors
featuring in public debates in the context of CJEU judgements might indicate a
certain de-politicizing effect of shifting conflicts about the posting of workers to
judicial fora. Nevertheless, the share of public statements by non-governmental
actors is also considerable in the context of CJEU judgements. Hence, it shows
that the posting of workers is also mega-political in the second sense, as it involves
important societal cleavages which mobilise a wider set of actors. The issue at
hand is not left for governmental actors to debate.
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Figure 3: Actor expansion regarding posting in general and CJEU jurisprudence
in particular
In general

CJEU jurisprudence in particular

Finally, turning to polarization, this third dimension of politicization is also
identifiable in our newspaper compilation. Figure 4 demonstrates the aggregated
distribution of opinions a) on the general debate of EU posting of workers (to
the left) and b) in relation to CJEU mentions (to the right). The figure presents
the share of the different positions. Positions are generally polarized, as there are
many negative or positive positions and relatively few neutral ones. Most striking
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is the considerably larger share of negative opinions, combined with very few
positive opinions expressed in the context of CJEU rulings. We do not see
evidence that the Court, with its rulings, introduces new controversy or bias that
did not exist beforehand, and we can only speculate about potential explanations
for this observation. On the one hand, we might interpret this predominantly
negative debate about CJEU judgements on the posting of workers as a sign of
distrust in the Court’s ability to reconcile incompatible claims in these megapolitical conflicts. On the other hand, the Court might be an easy target for
blame-shifting83 by political actors, who are reluctant to accuse their peers in
mega-political conflicts, or even tacitly agree with the Court but do not want to
admit to their constituency.

Figure 4: Polarization regarding posting in general and CJEU jurisprudence in
particular
In general

83. See Blauberger & Martinsen, supra note 41, at 391.
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CJEU jurisprudence in particular

In sum, our newspaper analysis demonstrates that throughout the entire
2000–2020 period, EU posting of workers was politicized, both as a general policy
and also when the CJEU was called to rule on conflicts about the posting of
workers. Notably, when the CJEU concluded on the famous Laval-quartet, it
entered an already established terrain of mega-politics. Hence, it was not judicial
decision-making as such which set forth mega-politicization. Rather, the CJEU
was asked to decide on an already politicized terrain of mega-politics. Stepping
into this terrain, the Laval-quartet jurisprudence was perceived to side with the
free market dimension of the mega-politics cleavage, which only spurred further
politicization, at least in the short run. The role of the court in mega-politics is
delicate. We see that the actors expressing positions regard the role of the CJEU
much more negatively than the issue at hand in general. CJEU involvement in
this area of mega-politics is regarded as problematic.
V
TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF POSTED WORKERS JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT
OF POLITICIZATION
In the remainder of the analysis, we trace the evolution of CJEU case law on
posted work. While we cannot establish a direct causal link, we show that the
Court has adopted a more restrained interpretation of the freedom to provide
services after having been drawn into the heavily politicized Laval conflict. This
more recent case law also helped overcome obstacles to a political solution at the
EU level, eventually leading to the revision of the Posted Workers Directive in
2018.
A. From Assertive to Restrained Interpretation of EU Services Freedom
The ‘Laval quartet’ jurisprudence involved all sorts of mega-political conflicts
distinguished above and triggered fierce opposition at the European and member
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state levels.84 Yet, as will be discussed in greater detail below, EU member states
could not agree on a comprehensive legislative response to this case law. Rather,
it was the Court itself that initiated a certain re-balancing between internal
market principles and social protection with two judgements in 2015.85 In the
ESA case Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry v. Elektrobudowa Spółka Akcyjna, the
Court deviated from the opinion of its Advocate General, who had once again
found unjustified restrictions of the services freedom in the claims of a Finnish
trade union against a Polish employer of posted workers.86 By contrast, the Court
adopted a generous interpretation of what may be included when “minimum
rates of pay” are calculated for posted workers according to the rules of their host
country and also allowed categorizing them into different pay groups.87 In
Regiopost GmbH & Co. KG v. Stadt Landau in der Pfalz, the Court approved —
contrary to the position of the Commission — the inclusion of minimum wages
in public procurement contracts.88 While the ESA judgement is seen as departing
from, in particular, the Laval case, the Regiopost ruling adopts a strikingly
different position than the previous judgements in Rüffert89 and Bundesdruckerei
GmbH v. Stadt Dortmund90: “While . . . departing from the Rüffert approach, the
Court does not explicitly reverse its stance but instead goes to great length to
distinguish it.”91 In sum, these two cases are thus regarded as having “softened
the hardline market logic of the Laval and Ruffert rulings.”92
Despite the Court’s re-balancing, tensions between the freedom to provide
services and the rules for posting of workers persist. For example, in December
2019, the CJEU ruled in Dobersberger v. Magistrat der Stadt Wien on a case
concerning the Austrian railways’ Hungarian subcontractor whose employees
provide services on cross-border trains from Hungary to Austria.93 In the ruling,
the CJEU established that as long as the subcontractor’s employees perform
most of their work on Hungarian soil, and begin and end their work there, they
are not supposed to be considered “posted workers” (under Directive
96/71/EC).94 This rule applies even though the Hungarian company’s employees
84. See Blauberger, supra note 24, at 114–15.
85. See Sacha Garben, The Constitutional (Im)balance between ‘the Market’ and ‘the Social’ in the
European Union, 13 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 23, 38 (2017) (analyzing recent CJEU case law on the
relationship between economic freedoms and social regulation).
86. Case C-396/13, Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry v. Elektrobudowa Spółka Akcyjna,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:86, ¶ 71 (Feb. 12, 2017).
87. See Pieter Peonovsky, Evolutions in the Social Case Law of the Court of Justice: The Follow-up
Cases of the Laval Quartet: ESA and Regiopost, 7 EUR. LAB. L. J. 294, 305 (2016) (analyzing case law on
minimum wage(s)).
88. Case C-115/14, Regiopost GmbH & Co. KG v. Stadt Landau in der Pfalz, ECLI:EU:C:2015:760,
¶ 89 (Nov. 17, 2015).
89. See Rüffert, supra note 25.
90. C-549/13, Bundesdruckerei GmbH v. Stadt Dortmund, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235 (Sept. 18, 2014).
91. See Garben, supra note 85, at 39.
92. See Arnholtz & Lille, supra note 3, at 19.
93. Case C-16/18, Dobersberger v. Magistrat der Stadt Wien, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1110, ¶ 39 (Dec. 19,
2019).
94. Id.
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provide onboard services in Austria.
Yet, these later post-Laval rulings show a Court that appears to have stepped
back from the Laval quartet precedent and now accepts that additional
allowances can be part of the minimum wage.
B. From Litigation to Legislation (And Back to Court Again?)
Judicial and legislative politics are closely interlinked at the European level.
On one hand, the CJEU heavily influences legislative policy-making, while on
the other hand, EU legislators not only codify but often seek to modify or
override case law.95 As regards posted workers, the Laval quartet jurisprudence
was followed by a phase of (partial) EU legislative failure and domestic attempts
to contain judicial impact unilaterally, whereas the post-Laval jurisprudence
paved the way for the posted workers directive in 2018.
Immediately after Laval, critics of the Court’s case law called for a strong
political response. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) called for
a treaty amendment, proclaiming that the Court had decided on a hierarchy of
norms, with market freedoms highest and rights of collective action in second
place. In addition, the left-wing and social democratic groups of the European
Parliament took a strong position against the rulings and demanded political
action.96 The Commission was requested to take action to provide a solution to
the ‘case law problem.’97
As a result, the Commission presented two legislative proposals in March
2012: the so-called Monti II Regulation proposal and a proposal for an
enforcement directive on the posting of workers. Both proposals took issue with
the Court’s jurisprudence, aiming to ensure that the right to collective action had
not been dismantled and that hosting member states still had sufficient tools to
control and act against social dumping. The explanatory memorandum to the
Monti II proposal acknowledged that the Court’s rulings had “revived an old split
that had never been healed: the divide between advocates of greater market
integration and those who feel that the call for economic freedoms and for
breaking up regulatory barriers is code for dismantling social rights protected at
national level.”98 Whereas the proposal for an enforcement directive was adopted
by the EU legislators in 2014, however, the Commission withdrew its Monti II
proposal in September 2012 after wide-spread opposition from EU member
states. For the first time since the introduction of the “early warning mechanism”
95. See generally Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Judicial Influence on Policy Outputs?: The Political
Constraints of Legal Integration in the European Union, 48 COMP. POL. STUD. 1622 (2015) (discussing
legislative responses to unwelcome CJEU jurisprudence).
96. See, e.g., the European Parliament’s Resolution of 22 October 2008 on Challenges to Collective
Agreements in the EU (2008/2085(INI)), 2008 O.J. (C 15E).
97. See the European Commission, Hearing in the European Parliament, 2 June 2010; Martinsen,
supra note 38, at 199.
98. See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Exercise of the Right to Take Collective Action
Within the Context of the Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to Provide Services, at 3, COM
(2012) 130 final (Mar. 21, 2012).
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in the EU Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, twelve national parliaments raised objections
and, thereby, showed a “yellow card” against the Commission’s proposal.99 The
critique of the proposal was that it was an attempt to codify jurisprudence into
the legislative text, thus confirming the unwanted hierarchy of market freedoms.
The Commission’s withdrawal was welcomed by national parliaments, the
opposing members of the European Parliament, and by trade unions.100
Nevertheless, the European Parliament requested action from the Commission
to reestablish legal certainty in the aftermath of the Laval quartet.101
In the absence of an EU legislative response, individual member states sought
to contain the impact of CJEU jurisprudence domestically.102 Danish and
Swedish reforms aimed at protecting, more or less successfully, the autonomy of
social partners in response to Laval.103 As a consequence of the Rüffert
judgement, many German states that were ruled under social-democratic
participation introduced minimum wage legislation that specifically targeted
public tender situations.104 Ultimately, however, neither the enforcement
directive of 2014 nor member states’ unilateral responses could fully settle the
post-Laval conflicts about the posting of workers.
In March 2016, only months after the CJEU had partly readjusted its
jurisprudence on posted workers in the ESA and Regiopost cases, the
Commission was pressured by several Western EU member states and proposed
a revision of the Posted Workers Directive. The revision aimed at combatting
social dumping by establishing the principle of “equal pay for equal work at the
same workplace”; it was adopted by the European legislators as the amending
directive on posting of workers 2018/957 in June 2018 and had to be implemented
by EU member states by the end of July 2020. Most importantly, in order to
eliminate unfair wage competition, the revision replaced the reference to
“minimum rates of pay,” which had been the issue in Laval, with the broader
notion of “remuneration” according to Article 3 of the amended Directive.105
Consequently, in addition to minimum wages, all mandatory elements of
remuneration under national law and universally applicable collective
agreements in host states apply to posted workers.

99. Ian Cooper, A Yellow Card for the Striker: National Parliaments and the Defeat of EU Legislation
on the Right to Strike, 22 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1406, 1407 (2015).
100. See Marc Hall, Brussels Drops Plans for EU Law Limiting Right to Strike, EURACTIV MEDIA
NETWORK (Sep. 14, 2012) https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/brussels-dropsplans-for-eu-law-limiting-right-to-strike/ [https://perma.cc/8YBD-24B7] (discussing the withdrawal).
101. Martinsen, supra note 38, at 204.
102. See generally Blauberger, supra note 24, for a discussion of member state responses to CJEU
jurisprudence.
103. Seikel, supra note 21, at 1174–76.
104. See generally Sack, supra note 26 (analyzing German state legislation on public procurement
after the Rüffert judgement).
105. Directive 2018/957, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 Amending
Directive 96/71/EC Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of Services,
2018 O.J. (L 173) 16.
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The revision of the Posted Workers Directive was heavily contested, once
again triggering a yellow card by eleven national parliaments against the
Commission’s proposal.106 However, this time the yellow cards were mainly
submitted by Eastern European member states and the Commission did not
withdraw its proposal. In contrast to the Monti II regulation proposal, the
European legislators ultimately agreed on a legislative compromise. Only a
combination of various factors can explain how a window of opportunity opened
and enabled policy entrepreneurs such as the Commission, the Council
presidency, and then newly elected French President Macron to shift the balance
in the mega-political area of posted workers towards greater social protection.107
Without doubt, the Court’s preceding readjustment of its posted workers
jurisprudence and European legislators’ strategic use of it are essential parts of
this explanation. Whereas references to the Laval quartet rulings ran through the
Monti II proposal as a red thread and were a major part of the Commission’s
justification,108 the Commission’s proposal for revising the posting of workers
directive made only one reference to the case law––namely to the ESA case, that
is, belonging to the softened turn in jurisprudence. Building on this case, the
broader notion of remuneration was justified and introduced into the revised
Directive.
In sum, the Court’s more restrained interpretation of the free movement of
services has not ended the politicization of the posting of workers. But it
facilitated another legislative attempt to settle the underlying conflict and partly
removed the Court from the spotlight of politicization. Still, the Court could not
escape the mega-politics of posted work for very long. Soon after the adoption,
two member states outvoted in the legislative process — Poland and Hungary —
challenged the legality of the revised Posted Workers Directive and called for its
annulment. However, on December 8, 2020, the Court dismissed these
annulment actions and thus confirmed that the amendment of the directive
strengthening the rights of posted workers was in line with EU free movement
principles.109 In other words, the Court sided with the political majorities of the
EU legislatures.

106. Alexis Lubow & Susanne K. Schmidt, A Hidden Champion? The European Court of Justice as
an Agenda-Setter in the Case of Posted Workers, 99 PUB. ADMIN. 321, 329 (2020).
107. Daniel Seikel, Die Revision der Entsenderichtlinie. Wie der lange Kampf um die
Wiedereinbettung exterritorialisierten Arbeitsrechts gewonnen wurde, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, SWI
Working Paper Nr. 212 (2020) (analyzing a combination of favourable conditions that facilitated member
state agreement on the revision of the posted workers directive).
108. Martinsen, supra note 38, at 202, 206.
109. Case C-620/18, Hungary v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:2020:1001, ¶ 190 (Dec. 8, 2020);
Case C-626/18, Republic of Poland v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:2020:1000, ¶ 150 (Dec. 8, 2020).
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VI
CONCLUSION
The European Union is marked by different terrains of mega-politics. At
times, the CJEU is asked to interpret conflicts that undergird these cleavages and
conflicts of high politics. In this article, we have examined what happens when
processes of judicialization and politicization collide in an area of mega-politics,
the regulation of posted workers in the EU. We identified our case as one of
deep-seated mega-politics — that evokes interstate conflicts, social cleavages,
and sovereignty issues. Our newspaper analysis traced politicization throughout
a twenty-year period of fundamental change to EU integration in our issue area,
including the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, an increase in posted workers,
landmark CJEU litigation, and proposals and compromises of the relevant EU
directives.
The analysis demonstrates politicization of posting of workers in general, as
well as in relation to CJEU jurisprudence in particular. An important finding of
our analysis over time is that the landmark cases of the Laval-quartet did not
trigger politicization as such. Rather the CJEU was drawn into an already
politicized terrain of mega-politics. Another important finding is that the court’s
interventions in our terrain of mega-politics is evaluated more negatively than
EU regulation of the area in general. The majority of actors expressing opinions
take position against the court. This suggests that in particular a non-majoritarian
institution like the CJEU has to tread carefully into a terrain of mega-politics.
We then examined more recent CJEU jurisprudence concerning the posting
of workers in light of politicization and political opposition. Our analysis suggests
a certain responsiveness of the court under such conditions. The CJEU has
adopted a more restrained approach in its interpretation of freedom to provide
services after the massive politicization of the issue of posting of workers in
relation to the Laval-quartet. We also show that the more restrained approach
paved the way for a political compromise by means of legislation. The case-law
of 2015 marked a notable departure from the Laval-quartet and helped to
overcome obstacles to a political compromise at the EU level, leading to a
revision of the posting of workers directive.
In sum, our analysis of politicization and judicialization over time makes it
possible to identify different sequences of two intertwined dynamics. Five
sequences emerge: 1) from the outset, EU’s regulation of posting of workers
stepped into an already established terrain of mega-politics between free market
and social protection; 2) the (in)famous Laval-quartet did not trigger
politicization but did not ease it either; 3) in the more immediate aftermath of
the landmark rulings, much opposition was expressed but EU legislators could
not agree on a comprehensive legislative response to the case law; 4) rather, in
the light of politicization and fierce political opposition, the court itself initiated
a post-Laval re-balancing towards more social protection and thus departed from
its pre-dominant market logic; 5) this judicial departure also allowed for a rebalancing by legislative means towards greater social protection.
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On a more general account, our findings demonstrate that even in a highly
judicialized system like the EU with a very powerful court, politicization impacts
the CJEU’s ability to promote judicial integration. Furthermore, judicial
responsiveness to politicisation is key to pave the way for compromise. Certainly,
the Court’s more restrained approach has not ended politicization and cleavages,
and conflicts have not disappeared. The mega-politics of posted work remains.
But the later responsiveness of the CJEU facilitated a legislative compromise,
which has taken the Court out of the political spotlight for the time being. Thus,
our analysis confirms that the scope condition for the impact of judicialization in
mega-politics depends on political reactions. At the same time, court
responsiveness is important for legislative compromises when mega-politics is
expressed. None of the different judicialization and politicization sequences
stand out as conclusive. Nor can they be read separately. Instead, they pair and
relate, reading into the signposts of one another.

